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Abstract: 
If one had to identify the biggest change within the philosophical tradition in the twenty-first century, 
it would certainly be the rapid rise of experimental philosophy to address differences in intuitions 
about concepts. It is, therefore, surprising that the philosophy of medicine has so far not drawn on 
the tools of experimental philosophy in the context of a particular conceptual debate that has 
overshadowed all others in the field: the long-standing dispute between so-called naturalists and 
normativists about the concepts of health and disease. In this paper, I defend and advocate the use of 
empirical methods to inform and advance this and other debates within the philosophy of medicine. 
Keywords Philosophy of medicine; Experimental philosophy; Conceptual analysis; Health and 
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There is a widespread and unfortunate tradition in philosophy that the man in the street has all the empirical knowledge 
required for philosophizing. 
– Daniel C. Dennett [1, p. 1] 
Introduction 
If one had to identify the biggest change within the philosophical tradition in the twenty-first century, 
it would certainly be the rapid rise of experimental philosophy. What began as a small initiative to 
promote empirical methods within philosophy and test the intuitions of so-called armchair 
philosophers has led to a wealth of studies on the intuitions of the public concerning a diverse range 
of philosophical subjects in epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and even aesthetics. The field has 
quickly grown into a lively community but faces criticisms from both inside and outside the discipline 
of philosophy. 
Owing to an array of defences by respected philosophers of science, experimental methods have 
become increasingly common and accepted within the philosophy of science (see [2–6]). While this 
has led to major changes in thinking and a more pluralist attitude towards the use of scientific tools 
within philosophy of science itself, it would be premature to call this a victory for experimental 
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philosophy of science. Indeed, there is one subdiscipline of philosophy of science in which 
experimental philosophy is notably absent: the philosophy of medicine. I think this is unfortunate and 
would like to use this opportunity to remedy this omission. 
Indeed, the lack of empirical methods in the philosophy of medicine is all the more surprising 
given that experimental philosophy has predominantly been used to challenge many of the more 
intuition-grounded conceptual debates in philosophy. Experimental work on scientific concepts 
includes early studies on the gene concept [7], innateness [8, 9, 10], the economists’ concept of choice 
[11], consciousness [12], and conceptual differences between natural and social scientists more 
generally [13, 14]. Yet, one particular conceptual debate has overshadowed all others in the philosophy 
of medicine: the long-standing dispute between so-called ‘naturalists’ and ‘normativists’ about the 
concepts of health and disease—specifically, whether these terms refer to value-free scientific 
concepts or value-laden social ones. But as the quotation from Daniel Dennett in the epigraph of this 
paper is meant to illustrate, the very notion that a theory of health and disease could be developed by 
reference to one person’s intuition alone strikes me as quite strange if not absurd, and yet this seems 
to be the dominant view in the philosophy of medicine with mere intuitions of different philosophers 
being traded. This is where experimental philosophy has a useful role to play by gathering empirical 
data about the intuitions of a much broader class of people. In this paper, I shall defend and advocate 
the use of empirical methods to inform and advance the conceptual discussion of health and disease 
and other debates within the philosophy of medicine, a discipline that has so far resisted the empirical 
turn within philosophy. 
The paper is structured as follows: It begins in the next section by offering a brief sketch of the 
philosophical literature on health and disease and articulates a problem for traditional conceptual 
analysis that I dub the intrinsic limitation problem, following Maël Lemoine [15]. Then the methods 
of experimental philosophy are introduced as a necessary solution to this problem and several of the 
objections philosophers of medicine are likely to raise are addressed before concluding with a 
discussion. 
Conceptual analysis of health and disease 
The central question within the philosophy of medicine is how to define and understand concepts 
such as health, disease, and pathology. This philosophical question has garnered much attention 
throughout recent decades and continues to be one of the most heatedly debated issues in the field 
(see [16] for an overview). Traditionally, the contenders within this debate have been grouped into 
two opposing camps: naturalists, who try to ground the concepts in objective biological facts, and 
normativists, who argue that these concepts cannot be grounded purely in objective facts about science 
because they are ultimately value-laden (depending on the human viewpoint) or culturally relative.1 
While this characterisation offers only a simplified and coarse-grained picture of the multifaceted 
debate on these concepts, it will be sufficient for my present purposes, since I simply aim to show that 
 
1 Despite the existence of these two camps, one should not think of either as particularly unified. The positions of 
normativists in particular share only very little family resemblance aside from their unified dismissal of naturalistic 
approaches to health and disease. These anti-naturalists reject Dennett’s dictum of ‘Darwin’s universal acid’ that 
natural selection leaves none of our folk concepts unchanged [17, 18]. 
the traditional philosophical method of trying to resolve this debate—conceptual analysis—is likely to 
remain unsuccessful. I am not making any claims regarding the sensibility of the dichotomy in terms 
of which the debate has been historically framed. Whether one should be an eliminativist, pluralist, or 
unificationist about the conflict between normativism and naturalism in this debate is, as I shall argue, 
to a non-negligible extent an empirical matter. Here, it is useful to take Lemoine’s recent critique of 
conceptual analysis as a starting point. 
The intrinsic limitation of conceptual analysis 
Traditionally, conceptual analysis, or the descriptive analysis of concepts, has been assumed to play 
the central—if not the only—role in settling the conflict between naturalism and normativism on the 
meaning of health and disease. The two most influential naturalist accounts in this debate, Christopher 
Boorse’s bio-statistical theory and Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis, have made 
explicit reference to conceptual analysis in their methods [19–23]. Boorse, for instance, states in his 
1997 essay: ‘twenty years ago, in four papers, I offered a unified descriptive analysis of health, disease, 
and function’ [21, p. 4]. Historically, most of the contributors to the discussion have paid little if any 
attention to the meta-philosophical question of whether this method is an appropriate one. As 
Lemoine points out, ‘all participants implicitly agree about the utility of conceptual analysis to settle 
the debate’ on how disease should be defined [15, p. 316].2 There are a few notable exceptions, such 
as John Matthewson and Paul Griffiths on the naturalist side and Quill Kukla on the normativist side, 
who do not try to capture the meaning of the terms as used by the public but specifically try to revise 
the concepts of health and disease for the purposes of science and justice, respectively [25–29]. Most 
of what has been published in this debate, however, squarely falls under the rubric of conceptual 
analysis. 
Since I am interested in the intrinsic limitation problem identified by Lemoine [15], according to 
which conceptual analysis cannot rule out stipulations about a term’s internal content, I will follow his 
formalisation of this methodology in order to make the problem visible.3 When philosophers are 
interested in the conceptual analysis of a term—be it ‘health’, ‘disease’, ‘pathology’, ‘disability’, or 
‘illness’—they start from something cognitive scientists have called exemplar theory. 
Exemplar theory postulates that humans learn and apply concepts by comparing new stimuli to 
stored collections of particular instances, such that a new stimulus is classified as a member of a given 
category if it bears a strong enough context-dependent similarity to the sum of the remembered 
instances, or exemplars, contained within that category [30]. While this strategy of intuitive 
categorisation might be enough in common practice to categorize pathologies such as an infection, it 
is unsatisfying to most philosophers of medicine who want a theory of health and disase.4 Instead of 
 
2 This assumption is not exclusive to the philosophy of medicine. It is very much conceived as the modus operandi 
in many conceptual debates in philosophy—indeed the general practice of philosophy itself—and has thus received 
an array of criticisms (see [24] for an overview). 
3 Lemoine’s analysis of conceptual analysis is based on the work of Christopher Boorse [20–22], Lennart Nordenfelt 
[31], and Jerome Wakefield [23, 32]. 
4 It may be similarly unsatisfying to policymakers, funding agencies, and insurance companies faced with the line-
drawing problem of which conditions should be called pathological. Biologists, on the other hand, should be much 
happier to embrace such vagueness, since the biological world does not lend itself to sharp distinctions. Naturalist 
accounts of health and disease may thus permit a higher degree of indeterminacy than normativist ones. 
simply comparing new cases against a set of uncontroversial cases of health or disease, philosophers 
aim to construct a definition from the latter. This definition must provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions by which a case can be classified as healthy or pathological and may include exceptions to 
these criteria in order to provide against easily constructed counterexamples [15, p. 310]. With a 
successful definition of health or disease in place, philosophers should be able to place controversial 
cases either inside or outside the set of instances designated by the term (called its extension). Progress, 
it is assumed, proceeds by subjecting these definitions to attacks that would warrant their revision or 
replacement in hopes of coming closer to the correct account of health and disease. Lemoine identifies 
three distinct kinds of attack to that effect: 
(1) cases falling within the commonly accepted extension of the term but which do not satisfy 
the opponent’s definition, (2) cases that do satisfy the opponent’s definition but which fall 
outside the commonly accepted extension, and (3) cases that fall clearly inside or outside the 
extension but which the opponent’s definition fails to classify at all. [15, p. 310] 
Boorse characterises this back-and-forth process of definition and attack as a game: ‘to call pregnancy 
per se unhealthy would strike at the very heart of medical thought; it is the analytic equivalent of the 
“Game Over” sign in a video game’ [21, p. 44]. And this game sure has had many contenders. Despite 
being doubtless the most discussed work in the literature, Boorse’s decades-old bio-statistical theory—
first introduced in 1977 [20]—is far from well accepted. While there have been slight amendments to 
Boorse’s original account, the continual assault against it in the literature is hardly indicative of a 
process apt to culminate in the establishment of a single prevailing definition: there are now more 
accounts rather than less. One might thus question, then, whether the participants in this discussion 
are actually following the supposed rules of conceptual analysis, according to which one wins the 
debate by ‘eliminating the other contenders’ definitions and not having one’s definition eliminated’ 
[15, p. 311]. 
Nonetheless, as Lemoine shows, these rules seem to play a core role in the work of Boorse, 
Nordenfelt, and Wakefield; all of them ‘(1) propose a definition of health, disease, or both, (2) give 
examples of actual diseases, (3) examine apparent counter-examples, and (4) offer counter-examples 
to the contending proposals for definitions’ [15, p. 311]. Definitions are often argued to be either too 
narrow, excluding conditions considered to be diseases (such as septicaemia, asthma, or 
atherosclerosis), or too broad, including conditions that would preferably not be labelled as diseases 
(as in the pregnancy example above). Lemoine observes that for this kind of analysis to eventually lead 
to success, or at least make progress, there needs to be some manner of consensus among participants 
in the debate as to which conditions count as healthy or pathological. But the need for such consensus 
extends only to the clear cases a concept is intended to capture—since controversial cases can easily 
be dismissed as unclear out of hand, it is the inclusion of consensually health conditions or exclusion 
of consensually diseased conditions that is damning for a definition of disease. In that way, the 
argumentative process of conceptual analysis will not lead to a definition that rules controversial cases 
in or out. As Lemoine points out, ‘if several definitions could match the same set of uncontroversial 
cases, it would not matter whether they agreed or disagreed on controversial cases [15, p. 316]. Insofar 
as multiple different definitions of a concept are left standing in the face of uncontroversial 
counterexamples, then, conceptual analysis alone will not be able to settle the game and pronounce a 
winner. This is an ‘intrinsic limit of conceptual analysis’: it cannot rule out specific claims about how 
a concept should be defined [15, p. 316]. 
Whether the solution to the conceptual controversy about health and disease is found in the 
naturalist or normativist camp cannot be established using conceptual analysis if both sides can offer 
accounts that cover the uncontroversial cases equally well. I see no a priori reason to doubt that there 
is conceptual room on both sides for such definitions. The debate is thus, as Lemoine argues, 
‘hopelessly unlikely to decide between two reasonably successful definitions of “disease” or “health”’ 
[15, p. 323]—that is, if its participants limit themselves to conceptual analysis alone. 5  Lemoine 
concludes his paper with the declaration that ‘in order to prove naturalism or normativism right, 
another method has to be embraced’ [15, p. 324]. I shall follow this call for action and introduce 
another method in the philosophy of medicine that can make empirically supported judgments 
regarding intuitions about and uses of concepts in the public domain and medical profession—namely, 
experimental philosophy (sometimes abbreviated as x-phi or XPhi).6 
Experimental philosophy to the rescue 
That Lemoine’s call for an alternative method can be used to offer a defence of experimental 
philosophy of medicine comes as no surprise. The criticisms Lemoine brings forward against 
conceptual analysis have been echoed in similar form by many naturalist philosophers, and especially 
those that advocate the use of empirical methods. Experimental philosophers (among others) have 
long criticised the tendency of philosophers to rely on their own intuitions to posit the meaning of a 
term, rather than the intuitions of the general population whose usage they are supposedly capturing 
[36]. Here one might legitimately wonder whether intuitions—be they philosophical, scientific, or 
lay—are actually helpful to understand the target of a concept. Why should it be assumed that mere 
intuitions can help settle these conceptual questions, especially those of broader (non-specialist) 
populations? 
Unfortunately, experimental philosophy is often narrowly understood as the use of surveys to 
capture the intuitions of the public, rather than as a more general view of philosophy as a discipline 
continuous with the sciences and thus apt to use empirical data to inform its debates. A naturalist 
understanding of the x-phi critique of conceptual analysis turns the usual critique of x-phi on its head. 
Rather than criticising the use of empirical methods to address philosophical issues as something that 
is not philosophy, a naturalist criticises philosophical debates for a lack of empirical tools. In 
promoting x-phi, I aim to spark an empirical turn in the philosophy of medicine similar to the one 
initiated by Dennett in the philosophy of mind. In his words: 
 
5 This is not to deny that conceptual analysis may have contributed positively to the conceptualisation of health and 
disease—progress that some will surely use to argue for a more optimistic stance on whether conceptual analysis can 
solve the debate. But this further step should be avoided. For additional reasons pertaining to problems with 
conceptual analysis that I do not have space to detail here, I am rejecting this position; see [33] for various 
philosophical attacks on conceptual analysis. My primary goal in this piece is merely to encourage philosophers of 
medicine to embrace a wider toolkit of methods in order to settle the questions they are interested in. 
6 While Lemoine intends to solve this debate by motivating a naturalist account of health and disease that actually 
draws on the full breath of biomedical science, I offer an alternative solution here. Nevertheless, in a conference 
report, Lemoine et al. tentatively suggest that experimental philosophy could fruitfully be applied to the philosophy 
of medicine [34]. In my dissertation, in turn, I follow Lemoine’s call for an attempt to naturalise the concepts of 
health and disease [35]. 
As a graduate student at Oxford (1963-65), I developed a deep distrust of the methods I saw 
other philosophers employing. That was the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, and 
‘theories of mind’ were debated on the basis of a lean diet of conceptual analysis—as if one 
could develop a theory of horses on the basis of nothing other than a careful investigation of 
the meaning of the ordinary word ‘horse’. I decided that I had to supplement (and maybe even 
adjust!) the fruits of ordinary language analysis with an attempt to figure out how the brain 
could possibly accomplish the mind’s work. [37] 
What I am advancing here is not merely the uncontroversial claim that empirical methods can improve 
debates in the philosophy of medicine, but also the more substantial one that empirical methods are 
necessary to make progress in the general conception of health, disease, and pathology. Understanding 
x-phi as part of the larger project of naturalist philosophy makes it naturally fit with two distinct 
naturalist critiques of conceptual analysis that are often brought forward against x-phi: (i) concepts are 
not definitions and (ii) intuitions are a poor guide to understanding natural phenomena. First, x-phi 
may very well reveal that the way people categorise the world cannot be captured in simple definitions 
made up of necessary and sufficient conditions. But this finding would go to show only that conceptual 
analysis has rested on mistaken assumptions, not that x-phi has somehow failed because it cannot 
provide such conditions. Second, naturalists should be happy to make a distinction between people’s 
psychological categorisations and the way the world is. Conceptual analysis is sometimes ambiguously 
understood either as the search for a concept’s essence or true meaning or as a mere set of ‘criteria of 
application’ that actual humans use when employing certain concepts [38, p. 171], but these goals are 
distinct. Naturalists can both engage in a scientific investigation of how people end up with and 
employ concepts in communication with others and their own thinking and engage in a scientific 
investigation of whether these concepts map onto real phenomena in nature. Whereas Lemoine, along 
with others such as John Matthewson and Paul Griffiths [25], abandons conceptual analysis in favour 
of the latter approach—that is, grounding concepts in science [15, 39]—this paper will advocate the 
former approach, using surveys of the public, medical practitioners, and scientists to advance the 
debate between so-called naturalists and normativists. Importantly, however, these approaches are not 
incompatible and can inform each other, especially where scientists’ intuitions diverge from their 
empirical findings, as Griffiths and colleagues’ work on the idea of innateness and the gene concept 
elegantly illustrates [7–10]. The once purely philosophical project of conceptual analysis is thus 
replaced by two distinct investigations: one an empirical investigation of the psychology and sociology 
behind our concepts, the other a scientific investigation of the phenomena these concepts supposedly 
map onto.7  
Now, while it is surely justifiable to ask why one should be a naturalist and rely on empirical data 
at all, this is not the place to answer these concerns. This is a paper about the philosophy of medicine, 
a field where scientific approaches such as those of Lemoine, Griffiths, and Matthewson are rare and 
x-phi is notably absent. Due to considerations of space, I give only a positive account, showing how 
experimental philosophy could be used to improve the philosophy of medicine by discussing its most 
famous conflict. If this approach is meant to fail, its failure will likewise have to be empirically 
demonstrated and not a priori asserted. 
 
7 For more detail on the second of these options, see my article [40], parts of which are revised here. 
Conceptual analysis requires experimental philosophy 
The primary argument for experimental—or, better yet, empirical—philosophy of medicine is this: 
successful conceptual analysis in its nature requires empirical data. Here a lexicographical approach is 
illustrative and shares a close connection to traditional conceptual analysis. 
In the course of compiling a lexicon, lexicographers will select a list of examples representative of 
a word’s usage and then either organize these examples into different senses or present a definition 
that covers all uses of the word. However, a single definition is often not provided or may be stated 
in quite inclusive terms so as to not exclude any examples. One reason for this is simply pragmatic: 
some lexical items are applied in very different contexts in which they have different meanings that 
cannot be unified under a single concept. The concepts of health and disease are taken to be radically 
different in that regard, assuming that there is a single ‘correct’ unifying concept. If the goal is 
conceptual analysis of a term as used by a linguistic community, one cannot take one’s own intuitions 
as a starting point, unless there is evidence that these intuitions are widely shared. Indeed, it is doubtful 
that one could even engage in such conceptual analysis without empirical methods. Irrespective of the 
tools philosophers use to get a grasp on these shared intuitions—whether they rely on interviews, 
surveys, bibliographic data, or participation in or observation of conversations about health and 
disease—even the very use of a lexicon to begin one’s conceptual analysis is empirical (though one 
might prefer to call this ‘light x-phi’ compared to more sophisticated and empirically demanding 
quantitative or qualitative studies). 
Experimental philosophy is not philosophy 
With this in mind, I will turn to a frequent challenge brought against experimental philosophy—that 
while it may be useful, it does not qualify as philosophy. One might then argue that philosophers 
should minimise their use of empirical methods accordingly, insofar as engaging in them would take 
time away from doing ‘real’ philosophy. This challenge, however, is no obstacle to the necessity of the 
kind of work advocated and carried out by those within the experimental philosophy community: if 
empirical methods such as surveys do not count as philosophy, then neither will opening a lexicon or 
reading medical papers. There is no line to draw here. 
The semantic dispute about whether or not this work should be called philosophy does not matter. 
It is work that needs to be done in order to make progress on philosophical questions. Yet sociological, 
psychological, or scientometric studies on the concepts of biomedical scientists or the public are 
relatively rare. After all, non-philosophers are generally not interested in particularly philosophical 
questions (with, perhaps, the exception of moral psychologists). So if good empirical evidence is 
necessary for conceptual analysis to be successful, and such empirical evidence is not otherwise 
collected, then philosophers occupied in conceptual debates may very well be forced to utilise the 
toolkit of science—that is, if they are ultimately interested in answering their philosophical questions 
and not merely engaged in a form of philosophical play. 
But how can experimental philosophy be used to address the intrinsic limitation problem of 
conceptual analysis identified by Lemoine? As mentioned above, at the core of any conceptual analysis 
of disease is a set of uncontroversial paradigm cases that any proposed definition needs to be able to 
cover and plausibly also a set of cases that it ought to exclude such as pregnancy. The present state of 
the debate suggests that the current set is too small to allow for a determinate winner or even to make 
substantial progress. Empirical methods like surveys can be used to widen the set of phenomena that 
must be accounted for under a given definition, particularly in talk of pathology within the biomedical 
sciences which may provide further paradigmatic cases that should be included. 
One way of widening the set would be to confront the public with controversial cases of diseases 
at the forefront of the conflict between normativists and naturalists. Another would be to expand the 
set of paradigm cases by considering the intuitions of the scientific community regarding the nature 
of medical conditions such as diabetes, autism, and viral infections that do not cause any felt harm but 
are nevertheless harmful to the organism (e.g., mosaic virus in trees). Sophisticated surveys might even 
attempt to discover the more abstract reasoning behind the classification process of participants. Are 
they drawing on scientific facts or the values of society? 
Normativists may be reluctant to adopt this procedure, since the reliance on naturalistic methods 
could appear to unfairly shift the debate in favour of naturalism, especially when directly investigating 
the intuitions of scientists rather than the public at large. Expanding the set of paradigm cases to 
encompass any sense of pathology in science might offer the impression that the game has become 
rigged, in that many normativists believe that the definitions of health and disease should be based 
not on scientific practice but on the common understanding of these notions. This potential for 
rigging the game by giving a preferential treatment to the folk understanding of health and pathology, 
might be called the dice-loading problem of naturalist experimental philosophy. Yet I contend that 
the dice-loading problem is immaterial insofar as experimental methods need favour neither a 
naturalist nor a normativist account of health and disease: the ‘winner’ of the conceptual game is 
determined—as with anything else in experimental philosophy—empirically.8 
There are two possible results for a study in experimental philosophy of medicine on the concepts 
of health and disease: either there is found to be substantial agreement about the extension of these 
terms among the public, medical practitioners, bioethicists, and biomedical scientists or there is found 
to be substantial—perhaps insurmountable—disagreement. Finding consensus that increases the 
number of uncontroversial paradigm cases of disease (and uncontroversial paradigm cases of non-
disease states) should at least be able to foster more harmony within the conceptual literature on health 
and disease. Since any successful analysis would be required to cover these cases, the intrinsic 
limitation problem could be minimised. The use of experimental methods would create a dice-loading 
problem only if there were a priori reasons to think that the empirical data would inherently support 
one view over another. But this is not so: experimental philosophy of medicine might just as well find 
that there is barely any consensus on the concepts of health and disease. Finding such a lack of 
consensus would make the case against naturalism much stronger, favouring those normativist 
accounts that relativise the concept to human interests and cultural dynamics. Let me turn now to 
 
8 An anonymous reviewer objected that the use of scientific methods might favour, rather than negatively affect, the 
normativist position. For example, if one can empirically show that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a given state to be classified as a disease, then the normativist, rather that the naturalist, claim is validated. There 
are two replies to this. First, the worry is that naturalist methods favour naturalist conclusions. If the opposite were 
true—that naturalist methods favour normativist conclusions—there would not be much of a problem: naturalists 
should then happily endorse normativism for it follows from naturalist reasoning. Second, it is not true that a failure 
of science to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for disease implies a failure for naturalism. The biological 
world simply does not lend itself to simple definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, so the concept 
of disease may very well have to be amended if it fails to map onto its counterpart in the natural world. 
examine both possibilities—finding disagreement and finding agreement, respectively. 
Pluralism and elimination 
 
Brian Robinson et al. and James Beebe and Finnur Dellsén have shown that scientists in different 
fields not only hold different methodological standards, but also interpret philosophical concepts such 
as objectivity and realism in very different ways [13, 14].9 An anecdote is useful here: the behavioural 
economist George Loewenstein argues that economists seem to have a much more thorough and 
empirically supported take on what constitutes a ‘theory’, for instance, as compared to how 
psychologists understand the term. 10  Such anecdotes are relevant to the project of experimental 
philosophy of medicine insofar as the use of terms that have different meanings in medical practice, 
paleopathology, immunological research, bioethics, evolutionary biology, and wider public use could 
impact on the nature of results pertaining to the concepts of health and disease. In using experimental 
methods to investigate whether those in different fields fall more into the normativist or naturalist 
camp, then, it is important to consider the nature of the questions asked. For example, if a study were 
to employ a simple survey-based methodology asking ‘Is health an objective measure?’ and find that 
the vast majority of participants across fields respond ‘yes’, this concurrence still might not reveal 
much about the concept of health held by the respondents, given that the concepts of objectivity and 
measurement are likely to vary among disciplines. The same goes for diverging results that may arise 
between fields: what initially appears as a difference in how, for instance, paleopathologists and 
medical practitioners understand the concept of health might really be an artefact of differences in 
how they conceive of ‘objective measures’. These difficulties are not insurmountable, but it is 
important to recognise them when designing appropriate questionnaires. 
Further, Robinson et al. note that questions probing scientists’ intuitions may be ambiguous to 
the extent that it is unclear whether participants are being asked to make judgments about a concept 
like the gene across the sciences or within their specific field [13]. Such challenges should be taken 
seriously prior to experimental design, for they could seriously hinder the descriptive analysis 
experimental philosophers are trying to achieve. One answer to this problem is that the results would 
still be meaningful since it would be both the natural scientists and the social scientists who interpret 
the question as one about either science in general or their specific discipline. But this is only an 
assumption. A medical practitioner might have a conception of disease that she takes to hold generally 
across all disciplines, whereas a paleopathologist might have a much more restricted understanding 
and see talk about health and disease as discipline relative. A veterinarian working in the agricultural 
industry might understand animal health  in a distinctive way, narrowly relating to factors that reduce 
livestock production.11 Here the usual criteria for informative scientific surveys such as sufficiently 
 
9 They show this difference to be especially pronounced between the social and natural sciences, thus making 
scientific integration difficult. 
10 From a class of his at Carnegie Mellon University. 
11 Animal welfare has historically been understood in this narrow way as physiological health or well-functioning 
[41–43]. 
large sample sizes apply.12 
One possible way of avoiding some of these problems is to engage in a particular form of 
experimental philosophy that, as Michiru Nagatsu points out [45], has become the standard within 
experimental philosophy of science—namely, factorial surveys, as introduced into sociology by Peter 
Rossi [46,*A]. These quasi-experimental survey methods employ vignettes, (i.e., concrete hypothetical 
descriptions) that are intended to capture participants’ implicit norms and concepts, while allowing 
for a sort of experimental manipulation of variables.13 Popularised within social psychology research, 
this method has been applied fruitfully to capture the diversity of conceptualisations in the biomedical 
sciences.  
Confronting participants with descriptions of conditions in animals could present a 
straightforward prospective means of testing their intuitions about health and disease. The intuitions 
of laypeople may support either normativism or naturalism in these cases. Of course, the views of the 
public may differ when compared to the views of medical practitioners, veterinarians, or evolutionary 
biologists. If there is no conceptual divorce between animal and human health, then at least three 
options will appear on the table: (1) animals cannot be diseased and animal disease is just a social 
construction, (2) biological differences exist between human and animal disease and to analogize them 
is merely to engage in some sort of ‘sympathetic regression’ from human experience to other living 
things [47, p. 223],14 or (3) there is no relevant distinction between human and non-human disease and 
human diabetes should be understood precisely the same as canine diabetes. One pathway for 
navigating these options might be to confront participants with the discovery of virophages (i.e., 
viruses that infect other viruses) and evaluate whether the existence of virophages changes their 
intuitions as to whether viruses can have diseases, especially in response to statements about viruses 
by microbiologists such as Jean-Michel Claverie, who argues that ‘there’s no doubt this is a living 
organism. … The fact that it can get sick makes it more alive’ (quoted in [52, p. 677]). Examples such 
as these are likely to be counterintuitive to most people, even scientists not working in microbiology, 
undermining the idea that experimental philosophy would lead to a dice-loading problem. By adjusting 
and comparing examples in different samples—for instance, broken leg in humans versus broken leg 
in dogs versus broken wing in birds—one should be able to test whether we are just 
anthropomorphising animals with high degrees of similarity to us or whether disease judgments persist 
even in cases considered controversial in the literature (e.g., plants). 
What if the analysis ultimately shows that there is no consensus? In that event, the idea of a 
conceptual ecology will be helpful that maps out the different functional roles of varieties of concepts [2]. 
One result that may be encountered is a diversity of conceptualisations of disease, even within the 
biomedical sciences. Veterinarians, for instance, might demonstrate a different concept of animal 
pathology than evolutionary biologists. When experimental philosophy is used to reveal such 
differences in how groups of people or scientists think, the experiments can be fine-tuned to figure 
 
12 Nonetheless, what might be assumed to be a necessary requirement of experimental design has not stopped 
publication of various experimental philosophy papers with astonishingly small sample sizes [44]. 
13 See Nagatsu [45] for a longer description and analysis. 
14 Note that Georges Canguilhem did not hold that animal diseases are a mere social construction and I have 
highlighted the importance of a phenomenological view of animal health and suffering elsewhere [48]. To tie the 
concept of health to the notion of subjectivity, however, might lead us to restrict these concepts to all and only those 
animals deemed conscious, thus transforming the debate into an even more perplexing one about the boundaries of 
animal sentience [49–51]. 
out the epistemic purposes a concept serves within a given group—that is, its epistemic niche. If there 
is a unified concept among livestock veterinarians, one can conceive of two extreme possibilities: 
either the concept is merely constructed for human purposes such as animal farming and slaughter, in 
which case classifying animals as pathological would be akin to diagnosing people with drapetomania 
(a disease hypothesised to explain why African slaves fled from captivity); or despite the involvement 
of various special interest groups and funding for research into minimising pathologies that cause a 
loss of yield, it is found that there is no difference in how veterinarians and biologists treat the concept 
of disease—both approaching it in a way that is purely objective. The possibilities are manifold. 
What such an analysis would reveal, however, is that there might not be a single unified concept 
of health or disease. Insurance companies, politicians, medical practitioners, evolutionary biologists, 
veterinarians, and the public might all have different conceptions of what it means to be diseased—
thereby revealing that the notion serves a variety of purposes that perhaps cannot be accomplished 
using a single concept. On the one hand, normativists such as Kukla are primarily interested in the 
roles the concepts of health and disease play for the purposes of justice [28], with some arguing that 
the purely naturalist conceptions of health and disease should be eliminated as mere misapplications 
or anthropomorphisms of these concepts. On the other hand, naturalists such as Boorse argue that it 
would do better to eliminate the idea that the concept of disease has any necessary connection to 
concerns about who deserves treatment or not [21, 22]. Some bioethicists, myself included, have even 
argued that the concept of disease plays no special role in deciding who deserves treatment or medical 
resources more generally, focusing instead on the notion of ‘enhancement’ [53–58]; that way, a 
normativist account of health and disease might even be abandoned. 
However, as Ingo Brigandt argues in the case of the species concept, pluralism need not imply 
eliminativism [59]. Scientists may very well embrace pluralism and learn to live with different concepts 
or models of health.15 Elsewhere, I have argued for a functional distinction between two kinds of 
conceptual engineering: moral conceptual engineering and naturalist conceptual engineering—the 
former aimed at moral, social, or political ends and the latter undertaken for scientific purposes [69]. 
Whereas moral and scientific goals dovetail nicely for concepts such as well-being or welfare, it is 
possible that concepts such as health and disease are simply used toward disparate ends, thus 
warranting a conceptual division. Boorse, for instance, has argued for a distinction between the 
concepts of disease and illness along those lines [19]. Alternatively, one could posit a biological disease 
concept called pathology, while reserving the terms disease and disability for a concept geared towards 
resource allocation (e.g., dysfunction plus welfare loss), in a combination of naturalism and 
normativism à la Wakefield [23].16 In maintaining such distinctions, it is not clear whether normativists 
and naturalists should be considered winners or losers. Nonetheless, if x-phi can help to resolve the 
needlessly hostile dichotomy between normativists and naturalists by challenging the very idea that 
there is in fact a single concept to be discovered through conceptual analysis, then my case for an 
empirical approach to these issues would be all the better. I will now address the possibility that 
 
15 I have argued for this with spect to models of empirical phenomena more generally [60–65]. It might not be 
possible to capture notions such as ‘autism’ [66, 67] and ‘welfare’ [65, 68] within a single concept or model, since 
the underlying phenomena are too disunified, attempting to mapping onto both normative and natural features of the 
world. The same may hold for health and disease. 
16 I have reservations against Wakefield’s view because his account makes it hard to discuss trade-offs of health and 
well-being that are clearly important in all kinds of bioethical debates, from those as straightforward as the potential 
injuries caused in mixed martial arts [70] to those as controversial as de-extinction [71]. Many debates in animal 
ethics are likewise centred around the question of whether it matters that we injure and kill other animals if they 
cannot feel pain [72]. Health and well-being can come apart. 
empirical investigation should instead reveal consensus across scientists, medical practitioners, and the 
public. 
Unification 
Perhaps a more optimistic result of experimental philosophy of medicine would be the straightforward 
expansion of uncontroversial cases of diseases. If not resolving the controversy between naturalists 
and normativists, such a result should bring both groups closer together. There is a sense here that 
experimental philosophy of medicine may indeed support naturalist conceptions. If experimental 
methods such as surveys show broad agreement across different domains (including the biomedical 
ones), the extension of the concept of disease will likely expand to include animal pathologies. But as 
Matthewson and Griffiths argue in their defence of naturalism, some versions of normativism would 
entail accepting ‘conceptual divorce between human disease and pathology as a biological 
phenomenon’ [25, p. 451]. If naturalism can account for all these cases of animal pathologies in 
addition to the narrower prior paradigm set and normativism cannot, a strong case is made for 
naturalism. Broadening the conditions that are considered diseased within a linguistic community in 
this way would then imply a failure of at least some normativist accounts that have neglected to 
consider pathology in the nonhuman realm. An account could no longer claim to offer the superior 
conceptual analysis if it fails to capture paradigm cases of health and disease in animals.  
Some normativists might worry that the inclusion of animal cases could underme the idea that the 
concept needs to be relativised to the interests of particular communities or perhaps needs to be split 
to have one concept for humans and one for non-human animals. Yet I am doubtful that 
encompassing animals in the extension of health or disease would serve to rule out all versions of 
naturalism or normativism. What remains in such a scenario will most likely be some kind of hybrid 
account of disease, requiring biological dysfunction but with some room for social considerations—
for example, many people would not consider conditions such as post-vasectomy sterility to count as 
a disease. If there is a large degree of unity among the public, such an approach may also allow for a 
bridging of naturalism and normativism by investigating ‘(i) which dimension(s) weigh more and (ii) 
whether and how different dimensions are interacting’ [45, p. 266]. Indeed, I view this investigation 
of conflicting intuitions as the most interesting avenue for future empirical work in the philosophy of 
medicine. Having discussed the potential outcomes of experimental philosophy of medicine, I will 
now situate them in their broader context and conclude the discussion. 
Discussion 
A core motivation of experimental philosophy is to shift the philosophical community’s perception 
of philosophy itself—moving away from the methodological idea that philosophy is about a specific 
set of tools and towards a more content-based conception of philosophy as a discipline that is 
interested in more abstract and conceptual questions. In this paper, I have argued that participants in 
what is perhaps the oldest debate within the field—namely, the question of how to understand health, 
pathology, and disease—are mistaken in thinking that a solution can be reached using conceptual 
analysis alone. Indeed, it is doubtful that many philosophers are actually interested in mere intuition 
play (despite statements to the contrary). When in the course of conducting a descriptive analysis of 
concepts, philosophers proceed to engage in what Lemoine calls extensional stipulation—namely, the 
inclusion of ‘cases of consensually healthy conditions’ (e.g., pregnancy) or the exclusion of ‘cases of 
consensual diseases’ (e.g., cancer) from the set of diseases [15, p. 318]—they are not purely using 
conceptual analysis; they are doing something else. 
Fields such as bioethics and medical ethics, with strong historical ties to the philosophy of 
medicine, have become increasingly empirical over the years, embracing the use of surveys, interviews, 
and other scientific tools to improve their investigations. Philosophers of medicine would do well to 
follow suit. While I have limited my discussion to surveys here—given that this method is most directly 
associated with experimental philosophy and has straightforward application to the concepts of health 
and disease in the philosophy of medicine—surveys are by no means the only possible empirical tool 
philosophers of medicine could import. Edouard Machery proposes that experimental philosophers 
might also avail themselves of a diverse range of cliometric and bibliometric techniques (e.g., machine 
learning and topic modelling) [6]. A more thorough overview of how different empirical tools could 
be applied within the philosophy of medicine is offered in the introduction to this special issue [*B]. 
Much of recent philosophy of medicine is closer to the ‘philosophy of science in practice’ and 
‘philosophy in science’ movements, which seek to be more naturalist, more pragmatic, and 
fundamentally closer to science than traditional armchair investigations [*C, *D]. Questions such as 
how medical practitioners see, use, and evaluate concepts like health, pathology, and disease are 
important to the philosophy of medicine. Yet these questions cannot be answered through 
introspection alone. They require investigative empirical methods. Even something as scientifically 
contested as anecdotes would offer better evidence than the mere intuitions of a single philosopher 
[73]. 
It is nevertheless important not to demand too much from experimental philosophy. Conceptual 
analysis must proceed from shared paradigm cases in order to bring forth resolution. The more shared 
paradigm cases there are (to which x-phi may add), the further the discussion can proceed with 
conceptual analysis. There is plenty of space for improvement short of complete resolution of a 
philosophical debate. The latter is rare, so it would be overdemanding to expect x-phi to resolve major 
disputes entirely—and overblown to criticise it for failing to do so. An absence of resolution is not 
the same as a lack of progress. 
One should therefore not expect empirical methods to produce a definitive and unique answer to 
the question of whether normativism or naturalism is right about the concepts of health and disease. 
Experimental philosophy may very well call into question the foundation of the debate itself by 
empirically investigating the intuitions that have given rise to it. The conflict might be settled in favour 
of one side, pluralism, or unification. I do not commit myself to any one of these pathways precisely 
because the correct course is not just a conceptual matter, but an empirical one too. That philosophers 
already possess all the empirical knowledge required for engaging in conceptual debates like the one 
about health and disease is a fantasy that needs to be abandoned. I can only hope that others will take 
up this baton in furtherance of an empirical turn in the philosophy of medicine. 
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